1 It supports 'a structure of expectations without which the intercourse of states would surely suffer an early collapse'. 2 While lacking a central legislature to make new and modify existing law, international society nonetheless has its own mechanisms for changing the law and keeping it up-to-date. As a result, international law is not immune or unsympathetic to the call of justice. The slowness with which many changes in the law take place is not so much a defect of international legal mechanisms as a reflection of the society in which they operate.
Unlike the situation pertaining in most domestic legal systems, international law should not be conceived as a means of social control, much less as an instrument of social reform (although there is a strong tendency to view it in such a manner 3 ). Rather it should be seen as a body of rules, deemed by those to whom it applies as binding, the purpose of which is to facilitate regular, continuous, and generally orderly international relationships.
As a legal system, it is sui generis. To evaluate the significance and efficacy of international law in terms of a domestic legal standard makes no more sense than to evaluate the merits and utility of one activity-say golf-in terms of another-say long-distance running.
As competitive sports as well as recreational activities both golf and long-distance running have things in common. But success in these activities, as well as being relative to the personal aims of the participant, depends on a strongly contrasting set of skills and mental and physical disciplines. To judge one in terms of the skills and disciplines needed to perform the other is absurd, or certainly not helpful. Likewise, it is absurd, or certainly not helpful, to judge international law in terms of the sources, mechanisms, and objectives of law emanating from a very different, domestic, social milieu.
A Sociological Approach
It may be inferred from this that the approach of the English school to international law is sociological. Members of the school have been at pains to point out that law always reflects the society from which it emanates. Any given system of law can only be properly comprehended and evaluated by examining the social milieu that gives rise to it. Sense can thus only be made of international law by making sense of international society. Importantly, the significance and efficacy of international law can only be ascertained by examining the nature, institutional structure, values (if any), and goals (if any) of international society. It was this essentially relativistic conviction that led Manning, in particular, to stress that International Relations should be not be conceived as part of Political Science, History or Law but as a distinct academic discipline: one which drew on these and other cognate disciplines, but which discarded their domestic, 'state-bound', legal, ethical and sociological presuppositions. law of diplomacy'. 5 According to James, '...the cardinal characteristic which distinguishes the international society from others is the lack of government, the absence of central authority and the concomitant dispersal of authority'. 6 Internationally there exists no central legislature to make new and amend existing legal rules. There is no central agency charged with enforcement of the rules. There is no central court or judicial body empowered to adjudicate disputes over the rules-or at least not one before which a state can haul another state against its will. In terms of H. L. A. Hart's conception of law as a union of primary (prescriptive) rules and secondary (institutional empowering) rules, in international society there are no universally agreed upon 'rules of recognition', 'rules of change', and 'rules of adjudication'. 7 In Bull's view, international law differs from municipal law 'in one central respect:
whereas law within the modern state is backed up by the authority of government, including its power to use or threaten force, international law is without this kind of prop'. 8 As a consequence, and in sharp contrast to municipal law, the efficacy of international law does to a large extent depend on self help, including on occasions the threat and use of force. It is for this reason, Bull continues, that there is an intimate connection in international society between the efficacy of law and the functioning of the balance of power. 'It is only if power, and the will to use it, are distributed in international society in such a way that states can uphold at least certain rights when they are infringed, that respect for rules of international law can be maintained'. 9 One consequence of the absence of central government is that the utility of international law as an instrument of social change is severely limited. In domestic society, law is frequently used as a tool of social policy. Changes are made to the law with the explicit intention of expediting changes in behaviour. The employment of this tool is often successful due to fear on the part of potential miscreants of punishment. But the main factor is the greater respect for the law qua law that domestic society enjoys vis á vis international society. 10 So while certain social changes necessitate the creation of new rules of international law or the amendment of existing ones (for example changes spurred by technological innovation in areas such as sea use, and the use of air and outer space), and while other desired changes can be assisted by changes in the law (for example in the field of human rights), the law itself is powerless to bring about changes in behaviour unless such changes are already desired by all the relevant actors.
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The English school acknowledges, however, that the setting of general standards in law can have a long-run effect on behaviour. James puts the point as follows: a set of exact rights and duties 'will almost certainly represent a pre-existing intent or willingness on the part of all subject to them to act in the way they indicate.' Their translation into law is therefore not likely to have much of an independent effect on behaviour. However, legal obligations that are only loosely defined may by virtue of that fact be accepted despite a lack of a strong commitment to their observance. Since they do not have to pin themselves down in detail, the signatories may reasonably assume that if they need to act in a way contrary to their commitment, they will not have too much difficulty in finding a reasonably plausible legal justification. 'However, once a principle enjoys the dignity of law states may come to feel, to a greater extent than before, that they should try to live up to it.' Moreover, 'the inducement to do so will … be stronger in that the principle is now established as a criterion, albeit a rather ambiguous one, in the light of which those bound by it can be judged.' Additional critical opportunities will have been created. As a result states may cautiously amend their behaviour in line with the obligation 'for they dislike being charged with breaches of the law'. 12 Giving a social aspiration a footing in law can thus help bring about the realisation of that aspiration over time. In this way law can have a modest independent impact on international behaviour. In James's view the abolition of the slave trade, the outlawing of the use of force as an instrument of national policy, and the delegitimisation of colonialism all had their legal roots in the establishment of an initially vague legal principle.
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The potential independent impact of law has recently been analysed by Yasuaki Onuma.
A prominent Japanese international lawyer, he categorises some treaties as 'aspirational' in that they embody global aspirations shared by the overwhelming majority of members of international society. Examples include the 1966 UN human rights conventions and the 1990 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In entering such treaties, states communicate to their peers in the most solemn way possible their intention to work towards certain common goals. These treaties are not necessarily observed from the outset in a strict manner. It is widely known, for example, that there is a gap between major human rights treaties and reality. 13 Yet framing such agreements in law gives them a dignity, legitimacy and authority that no member of the international club can openly deny. 'As such they induce convergence, if not strict observance, of the behaviour of diverse members of international society over a period of time'. 14 The trend for this kind of 'aspirational' law-making since 1945 is sufficiently strong for Dorothy Jones to talk of a 'declaratory tradition' in modern international law, a key feature of which is to create a body of rules and intentions more akin to moral philosophy than positive law.
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A further consequence of the absence of government is the familiar reflection on the security imperative. In domestic society individuals look to government and its agencies to provide a large amount of their physical, and in many cases their economic security. States are not so lucky. While they may belong to universal or regional associations whose declared job it is to ensure the collective security of its members, states know that when it comes to security they ultimately have to look after them themselves. This explains why, when a conflict arises between 'an urgent national demand and fidelity to the law' it is usually the latter that gives way. 16 Largely if not exclusively because of the anarchical setting in which they find themselves, states are highly self-regarding in their behaviour. normative rules provide a behavioural framework. As Alan James puts it, these rules are 'the sine qua non for the existence of coherent group activity or an effectively-functioning society'.
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Normative rules can be of several kinds: rules of prudence, of etiquette, moral or ethical rules. However, by far the most important kind of normative rules, in international as in domestic society, are legal rules. According to James:
The fundamental explanation for this is to be found in the different obligatory force of legal and non-legal rules. For, in the public sphere, non-legal rules carry a somewhat uncertain sense of obligation. Those to whom they apply are expected rather than obliged to observe them. A standard has been erected to which it is intended that behaviour should conform, but society and its members customarily feel that they have no ground for trying to insist upon it. Observance is the done rather than the demanded thing. Law, on the other hand, is inseparably associated with the idea of strict obligation. 20 Part of its obligatory nature is that the law generally aims for precision. Its object is to leave those bound by it in little doubt as to what it expects of them. There are exceptions, but 'generally the main function of law is to create an exact as well as a binding relationship'.
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Of course, the extent to which this function is achieved varies from law to law and from system to system. There is precise law and vague law, with not all vague law is bad law. In
Manning's view certainty as to what the law requires is the exception rather than the rule, even in the most orderly and legally fastidious societies:
What litigants get even from the highest court in the land, is at best a decision which is constitutionally and legally incumbent upon them to accept as presumably correct. It is formally binding upon them. But lawyers, even so, are at liberty to probe in published articles the reasoning upon which the decision rested. So, when it is said, in belittlement of international law, that all too often, when appealed to, its trumpet gives forth an uncertain sound, the fitting comment is that this is inevitable and only to be expected, since international law is like any other kind of law. 22 No sooner have they established the importance of international law, however, than they set about dispelling the sanguine belief that it has an independent causal effect on behaviour. In their view, international law does not so much determine state behaviour as provide a framework within which and with reference to which states make their decisions. 'The typical question asked by a state is not, what does the law require me to do? but, does the law permit me to do this? or, how can I lawfully achieve this goal? Likewise it will ask whether it has any ground for complaint in particular circumstances, or whether another state's complaint is well grounded'. 23 In Manning's view, it is in the main only indirectly that the decisions of states are influenced by legal considerations, the main factor at work here being 'the importance attached by others to the law's correct observance' (on which more below). 24 Bull similarly contends that while the rules of international law are widely observed, it would be wrong to conclude that the principal explanation for this is respect for the law itself.
'International law', he says, 'is a social reality to the extent that there is a very substantial degree of conformity to its rules; but it does not follow from this that international law is a powerful agent or motive force in world politics'. 25 States sometimes obey international law through habit or inertia: 'they are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of established principles'. 26 In more rational mode, they sometimes view actions sanctioned by international law as being 'valuable, mandatory or obligatory' regardless of any legal undertakings they may have acquired (what Bull calls the 'international law of community').
Observance may result from coercion or a threat of coercion from a superior force (the 'international law of power'). Observance may also result from the interest a state perceives in reciprocal action: many agreements are upheld by a strong sense of mutual interest (the 'international law of reciprocity'). The argument that states obey international law only when it coincides with their interests, or that they do so only for ulterior motives, does not however dispose of the question of the law's legal force. 'The importance of international law', Bull concludes, 'does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it'. 27 While it would be incorrect to assume that international behaviour is determined by the law, it is a salient fact that states often consider observance of the law to be in their interest.
Furthermore, they are almost invariably concerned to act in a manner not inconsistent with the law, or at least to act in a manner not inconsistent with a plausible reading of it. They are reluctant to acquire a reputation as law-breakers.
This latter point is central to Manning's interpretation of why international law meets with such widespread compliance. On the one hand, by providing a set of agreed symbols for the conduct of international relations, law in a sense simplifies international life. 'It is here,' he suggests, 'in the partial prefabricating of the hundred and one decisions that make up the daily round for the normal middle-of-the-road sovereign member of international society, that international law performs its most characteristic service'. 28 On the other hand, much of international life proceeds on the generally well-founded assumption that 'what is bindingly provided for will duly be performed ....And this despite the absence of a court around the corner before which a state defaulting on a promise may be hauled'. 29 States comply with many of their legal obligations because it is convenient or beneficial for them to do so. But they also frequently comply with the law even when the benefit derived from so doing is uncertain. The reason for this, Manning argues, is peer-pressure, real or perceived. According to Manning, 'like the individual, the state conducts itself in the presence of a cloud of witnesses, comprising a diversity of what to the social psychologist are known as reference groups. And, as often as not, if it be wondered why a state has done this or that, and no more obvious explanation avails, the answer is that, in doing this or that, it was meeting the expectations of some politically or diplomatically consequential reference group'. 30 A third defining feature of the English school's sociology of international law is the emphasis it gives to the lack of solidarity in international society. For members of the English school, unlike realists, lack of solidarity is more a cause of anarchy than an effect. The legal implications of this lack of solidarity are profound. It has largely undermined attempts to outlaw war and transform international society into a Kelsenian 'coercive order' in which acts of war are conceived as either breaches of law or measures of law enforcement. 32 In Bull's view, agreement on this conception is unlikely to be forthcoming. 'The typical case is that in which states are not agreed as to which side in a conflict, if either, possesses a just cause. There may be deep disagreement among states as to which side represents the community and which the law breakers, or there may be general concurrence in treating war as purely political in nature'. 33 Part of Bull's fondness for the positive international lawyers of the nineteenth century derived from their firm appreciation of the lack of solidarity in international life and their consequent view that the law did not distinguish between just and unjust causes of war. 34 A second consequence of the lack of international solidarity is that changes in the law can only be made on the basis of consent. States do not trust their fellow members of international society to make law for them since they cannot guarantee they will be of the same mind, of the same ideological and political disposition. In practice this has two important consequences. On the one hand, it means that international law is not easily altered. There are well established procedures in domestic society for altering the law even if such alterations are favoured by some but by no means all. In international society such procedures, to the extent that they exist, are invariably clumsy and inefficient. This makes international law more protective than municipal law of the 'vested interest of the few'. 35 On the other hand, it means that in frustration, or as a means of ideological warfare, states sometimes seek to press a majority view (or what they assume to be a majority view) on the rest of international society.
They thus seek to replace consent with consensus, and assume the mantle of speaking for the conscience of mankind. This approach led Manning to conclude that the principal site of this kind of activity, the United Nations, had become (in contrast to the far more honourable and honest League) little more than an arena for the conduct of political warfare. 36 In Bull's view, the tendency on the part of certain states to assume a consensus, and to act as if they represented that consensus when no consensus actually existed, was a major threat to international order.
'The result … is not that the rules deriving from the assumption of consensus are upheld, but simply that the traditional rules which assume a lack of consensus are undermined'.
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Criticisms
Four types of criticism are typically levelled at the classic English school's reading of the relationship between international law and international society. The first is that the school simply restates the core propositions of nineteenth and early twentieth century legal positivism.
The notion that society and law are inextricably intertwined, that the character of a legal system is always a reflection of the character of the society that gives rise to it, and that the anarchical character of international society accounts for the paramount importance of consent and selfhelp in international law-none of this is very original. The second criticism is that the school conceives international law in a limited and in certain respects unrealistic way. In confining its understanding of law to 'a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics ... The lack of willingness to criticise the law, according to this view, reflects general satisfaction with the law, which in turn reflects satisfaction with the values of the chief architects of the law:
the great powers. 39 The fourth criticism is that the school's propositions are very general in nature, and little effort is made to empirically verify them. While members of the English school have consistently stressed the centrality of international law to international society they have done little to establish causality; i.e. identify precisely the mechanisms by which and the extent to which law produces certain behaviours.
There is no doubt that nineteenth and early twentieth century legal positivism had a profound influence on the thinking of English School legal commentators, as recent scholarship has affirmed. 40 One of Manning's first published articles was a reappraisal of John Austin's jurisprudence. 41 Bull was influenced by Oppenheim and conceived much of his work in IR in terms of retrieving the lessons and wisdom of nineteenth century political and legal thought, which was based on a firm appreciation of the limits of cooperation, particularly collective decision-making and collective action, in a culturally plural world. 42 James was influenced by The second criticism comes in more or less radical forms, from the revisionist stance of Rosalyn Higgins to the instrumentalism of the New Haven school and the radical rejectionism of Martti Koskenniemi and Critical Legal Studies. 44 According to Higgins, international law is best conceived not as a body of rules but as a 'continuing process of authoritative decisions'. 45 Law involves far more than the impartial application of pre-existing rules. 'International law is the entire decision-making process ... not just the reference to the trend of past decisions'. 46 Those charged with making decisions on the basis of international law do not simply find the relevant rule and then apply it. Rather they make choices, not between fully justified and groundless legal claims, but between claims possessing varying degrees of legal merit. The process will always involve considerations-cultural, humanitarian, and political-other than the purely legal.
Higgins concludes that policy considerations are an integral part of the international legal process. 47 Whether they are aware of the fact or not 'authoritative decision makers' habitually rely on policy preferences and assumptions in arriving at decisions on the law. No amount of legal training will enable them to keep law 'neutral'. Law and politics are inextricably linked.
Higgins makes the further claim that international law is a normative system 'harnessed to the achievement of common values'. 48 This opens the door to a fully New Haven school conception of law as an instrumental tool for the realisation of these common values. In terms of this conception, international law is a body of rules understood instrumentally. Their value is judged according to the relative efficacy with which they foster the desired ends.
Purposive conceptions thus embrace a conception of law that is end-orientated. The contribution of Nardin and Jackson, at root, is to have constructed a more robust moral defence of international society than that hitherto provided by the English school. Bull's defence was that international society provided (or was capable of providing) a greater degree of order for its members (and indeed humankind as a whole) than its alternatives, and that these alternatives were in any event of doubtful viability. Nardin and Jackson persuasively add the liberty of states to pursue their diverse purposes to the moral good facilitated by international society. They further establish that there may be reasons to prefer a practically based association of states even when the achievement of a more purposive alternative is practicable. They thereby scotch the claim that the English school is guilty of moral complacency.
The fourth criticism concerning the generality of the English school's propositions, the failure to empirically verify them, and the failure to identify relationships of cause and effect amounts to a serious misunderstanding of the nature of its approach. The generality of its propositions is a reflection of the fact that, certainly in its classical mode, the English school has been concerned not with this or that state, or this or that group of states, but with the society of states as a whole. It has sought, to borrow a phrase from Manning, to take a bird's-eye view, and arrive at a general understanding of the role law internationally. Such an understanding is not one that can be empirically proven or disproven. Empirical evidence is always important, but all important is the way it is marshalled. There is no way, they contend, of marshalling evidence neutrally. All evidence is to a greater or lesser extent theory-driven. The important point is to be self-aware and self-critical of one's theories, as well as one's evidence. In the light of this, members of the English school have been encouraged by the fact that their understanding of the role of law internationally seems to account for certain key facts better than rival understandings: while state behaviour is never determined by law alone, states nonetheless take law very seriously; while they never act contrary to their perceived interest, they frequently deem law, or legal propriety, to be a factor in the calculation of interest; and while they sometimes breach the law, they rarely do so brazenly-they always attempt to offer 
Role of Power
One of the strengths of the English school is that it does not shy away from recognising the indispensable connection between power and law. As Carr reminded his predominantly utopian readership nearly seventy years ago, that the relationship between power and law is real and strong in all legal systems, even the most advanced and democratic. 54 But it is particularly strong in the international system. This relationship gave rise to despair, contempt, or cynicism on the part of many observers. But Carr and various English school thinkers that followed him, Butterfield and Bull most notably, were able to show that such reactions were inappropriate. The relationship between law and power at the international level was generally a healthy one in that it facilitated the performance of certain important functions. One of these was the maintenance of a balance of power. If law helps to facilitate the balance of power, its content at any one time necessarily reflects the area and extent of consensus achieved by the major powers. A legal system that attempts to go significantly beyond this area of consensus, such as that created by the League in 1920, is not only doomed to failure but threatens to bring the whole legal and moral order into disrepute. The chief defence of the intimate link between law and power internationally is that it takes the moral and emotional heat out of international disputes and rivalries, prevents campaigns of moral righteousness, and suppresses the latent domination of any one moral and political viewpoint. Far from being an anarchic principle, generating instability and mistrust, as many felt following the disaster of 1914, the balance of power encourages states to take a long-term view of their interests, to moderate their behaviour, and limit their ambitions. The law's job is to buttress these constraining forces without restricting the diplomatic and strategic flexibility required for effective balancing.
This is merely a sketch of what in English school writing is a complex, and often implicit, understanding of the relationship between power and law in international society. 55 I
have provided it to show that the English school has an answer to Marxists and Critical
Theorists who view international law as an expression of the will of the international ruling class, an ideological device for legitimising inequality and Western economic and military dominance. It also has an answer to radical liberal critics who view international law as too conservative and lacking in ambition, allied too closely to current reality. That answer is that legal rules have an important function to perform in preserving the balance of power, and it is reckless and erroneous thinking of the first order to propose legal reforms which would effectively unhinge law from the balance of power. The effects of such a move would be disorder and threats to the liberty of states, big or small, on a global scale.
This being said, the English school's stance on power and international law is not without its shortcomings, and in addressing them modern English school theorists are beginning to take the approach in some new and interesting directions. On the other hand it may be true, as one leading practitioner and legal authority has recently argued, that a judicial change in climate may be taking place. 56 States seem to be more prepared to impose strong structures upon themselves, and not run away, in the form of withdrawal of support, when the going gets tough. This possibility notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that courts and tribunals are a part of and are sometimes influenced by wider powerpolitical processes. Although they have ignored it in the past, the nature of this relationship will require greater scrutiny in the future from those working within the English school tradition. 
Challenge of Unipolarity
Domestic and Transnational Reference Groups
A realist might conclude that a superpower enjoying the unrivalled military and economic strength of the US is in a position to flout international law with impunity. It can use its strength and influence to minimise the impact of any measures other members of international society might deploy in response. The mere existence of its vastly superior strength and influence is sufficient to ensure that the response of many will be muted. It is interesting to observe, however, that even superpowers, when doing something controversial, invariably offer a legal defence, as well as a political or moral defence, of their actions. Even when they emphasise, as they sometimes do, the high moral causes for which they act, they never claim that such high causes justify their violation of the law. 61 Even in extreme cases where an act is manifestly in conflict with the law, states big and small still offer some sort of legal justification. 62 It is of course true that some major Powers (e.g. China) operate with extremely limited domestic restraints due to lack of effective opposition parties, an independent media, active and critical NGOs, and an independent judiciary. For these states it is the likely international reaction, not domestic, they will be most worried about when contemplating an act of doubtful legality. Most liberal democratic states will be worried by both the national and international reaction to any such act. It is a significant fact, however, that a Power such as the US is more likely to be worried and constrained by the likely reaction of certain important domestic actors than that of other states.
The cloud of witnesses in the presence of which states conduct themselves now embraces domestic as well as international actors. Many of these actors, from Amnesty and
Oxfam to Greenpeace and Jubilee 2000 are now importantly transnational in their organisation and scope. This is perhaps the most striking shortcoming of the classic English school's sociology of international law: the failure to take into account the role of domestic and transnational actors. The 'consequential reference groups' whose expectations and responses states have to take firm note, are no longer-if they ever were-comprised exclusively of states.
Compliance with the law can only be fully understood by examining the network of domestic, transnational and international restraints that prevail in any given case.
Conclusion: Method or Anti-method?
In this chapter I have refrained from using the word 'method'. The reason is that the English school does not have one. Indeed its whole approach is anti-pathetical to method. A method suggests the identification and execution of a series of precise steps in order to achieve a specific goal. It makes sense to talk of the method one might employ to learn a musical instrument or a foreign language, of the method employed by economists to calculate the GDP of a country or its rate of inflation. Method senso stricto suggests technique, the mastery of certain technical mental and/or physical moves in order to achieve a practical outcome. In this sense the English school eschews method. 'Approach' is a much more appropriate term, for it suggests a general outlook, the employment of a certain set of concepts, the advancing of a certain set of propositions, and the assumption of a certain style or character of argumentation.
The goal is not the acquisition of a skill, or technique, or practical capability. Rather the goal is general understanding or a general appreciation of 'the relation of things'. I remain wedded to the Manningite notion of connoisseurship: that is, refined judgment born of familiarity with and feel for a subject. This, rather than objectivity, or science, is what we should strive for in the pursuit of social understanding. 64 I have found myself using the term 'approach' throughout this chapter because this word captures the nature of the English school's engagement with the phenomenon of international law. What they attempt to arrive at is not technical knowledge, but an appreciation of the nature and character of international law, what we can reasonably expect of it, and how it relates to the wider scheme of international relationships.
This being said, if we conceive the notion of 'method' loosely as, say, ways and means of proceeding in the making of knowledge-claims, several explanatory strategies can be found at work in English school analysis. In his assertion that international law 'supports a structure of expectations without which the intercourse of states would surely suffer an early collapse', Alan James, for example, puts forward a functional explanation. In his assertion that '[t]he importance of international law does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it', Hedley Bull puts forward a rational explanation. Manning, by way of contrast, sees observance of law in terms of social dynamics: regard for legal obligations is to a large extent a function of the expectations of the relevant reference group.
This ties-in with the observation that one of the distinctive features of the school is its methodological pluralism. 65 At least two methods may be identified in the English School approach to international law. One is legal positivism, as identified above. This is concerned to identify what the law is. The second is aspirational legalism: the identification of soft law and broad declarations on a variety of moral themes in order to get a handle on where the law is heading. The methodological pluralism of the school is one of its chief assets. Being unencumbered by the need to identify a distinct method, being immune to the pressure-very considerable in some quarters-to adopt a method senso stricto, and being generally unselfconscious about methodological issues, has enabled the school to provide a rich account of the relationship between international law and international society. It is an account that is coherent and accessible, but not at the cost of loss of complexity. 
